6. See id. at 191 ("The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met.").
7. This Article will only address the liability of outside professionals or secondary defendants. Cf. Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. 97 Civ. 2690 LAP, 1998 WL 651065 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998 , slip op. at 17 n.12 (suggesting that the scope of primary liability for secondary actors may differ from that applicable to principals). For the purposes of this Article, secondary defendants include attorneys, accountants, banks, investment banks, and other professionals who render services in connection with securities disclosure. Some courts and commentators have sought to distinguish between these professionals in formulating liability standards based upon the nature of the services performed. See, e.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants Under Rule lOb-5, 53 Bus. Law. 1157 (1998) (describing developing patterns of liability standards imposed in cases involving accountants and those involving lawyers). This Article will not address the question of whether courts should develop different standards for different types of professionals.
8. 15 u.s.c. § 78 (b) (1994) . 9. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1998). 10. [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'l[ 90,136, 90,317 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998) , vacated on grant of rehearing, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (Mar. 9, 1998) , at 90,325 (holding that a defendant's participation in the creation of a fraudulent statement may the documents are fraudulent, the lawyer's conduct may be a sufficient basis upon which to impose liability as a primary violator for federal se curities fraud. Under this approach, a secondary defendant could incur liability for his or her participation in the creation of fraudulent state ments issued by someone else.11
The Second Circuit's approach has been different. In its most recent decision to address the issue, Wr ight v. Emst & Young, l 2 the Second Cir cuit employed a narrower standard for liability, 1 3 holding that "a secon dary actor cannot incur primary liability under the [Securities Exchange] Act for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemi nation."14 The court rejected the argument that a defendant could be liable based upon his or her substantial participation in the creation of fraudulent documents, reasoning that any conduct by the defendant short of actually making a false and misleading statement was merely aid ing and abetting, rather than a basis for primary liability.15
The disagreement between the Klein court and the Wright court stems from differing interpretations of Central Bank. More importantly, these decisions share an unduly restrictive interpretive approach-an ef fort to determine the scope of liability from the text of section lO(b) . The appropriate application of Central Bank has been complicated, how ever, by subsequent legislative developments: the enactment of two amendments to the federal securities laws that reform private civil litiga tion. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199516 (the Reform Act) dealt with perceived abuses by revising a variety of procedural and substantive aspects of private litigation, including explicit modification of the liability standards for secondary defendantsP More recently, the Se curities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 199818 (the Uniform Stan dards Act) preempted state statutory and common law securities fraud render him liable as a primary violator even if an investor is unable to attribute the statement to the defendant).
11. The Third Circuit subsequently vacated the panel decision and ordered reargument en bane. See Klein v. Boyd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (Mar. 9, 1998) . Before the case could be reargued, the parties settled, depriving the Third Circuit of the opportunity to resolve the scope of liability for secondary defendants. See Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143 and 97-1261 (Nov. 12, 1998 ) (order of the Third Circuit Clerk dismissing the case with prejudice in accordance with the agreement of the parties).
12. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 13. Cf. SEC v. First jersey Securities, 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that "primary liability may be imposed 'not only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its preparation."' (citation omitted)).
14. This Article begins by summarizing, in Part I, the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank and explaining how the lower courts have at tempted to apply Central Bank to determine the scope of primary liability for outside professionals under section 10 (b). In Part II, the Article iden tifies two important legislative developments that postdate Central Bank: the adoption of the Reform Act and the Uniform Standards Act. The Article then analyzes, in Part III, the methodology of Central Bank, and argues that the textualist interpretation espoused by the Court in that case is inappropriate. Instead, the Article advocates a broader approach, in which courts consider, among other things, the effect of the recent statutes and the policy objectives identified by Congress in those statutes. In Part IV, the Article applies its suggested approach to the problem of delineating the appropriate scope of primary liability. The Article argues that the statutes expressly endorse the continued importance of liability for outside professionals while, at the same time, instituting reforms ad dressed at the litigation abuses perceived by the Central Bank Court. Ac cordingly, the Article concludes that recent decisions have been unduly restrictive in their reading of section lO(b) liability and advocates more fidelity to the statutory purpose. The Article suggests that courts should give greater consideration to the nature of the professional's relationship with his or her client and the role of liability in enhancing the function ing of professionals as gatekeepers and furthering the integrity of the se curities markets.
I. THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY OF OUTSIDE PROFESSIONALS: THE LEGACY
OF CENTRAL BANK A. The Central Bank Decision
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court concluded that section 10 (b) 2 1 does not permit liability to be imposed upon those who aid and abet fed eral securities fraud.22 The decision came with little warning-courts and commentators had widely accepted the validity of aiding and abet ting liability. 23 The petitioner in Central Bank did not even raise the issue until the Court issued a sua sponte order requiring the parties to address it.24 Nonetheless, after rejecting the analysis of every lower court to con sider the question,25 the Court concluded that, because section lO(b) did not contain the terms "aiding and abetting," the scope of the statute did not extend beyond primary liability.2 6 21. Section 10(b) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa cility of any national securities exchange-(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or approptiate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994 ). 22. See Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994 In reaching this result, the Central Bank Court employed a strict tex tualist approach.27 The Court defended its reliance on the statutory text, in part, by using a distinction that it had recognized in only one other case,28 betvveen statutory interpretation issues involving the scope of con duct prohibited by section lO(b) and questions about the elements of the liability scheme.29 The Central Bank opinion explained that aiding and abetting liability involved a scope of conduct issue and that, accordingly, the text of the statute was controlling. 30 Nonetheless, the Court explicitly stated that outside professionals could still be liable under section 10 (b) as long as the requirements for primary liability were met.31
The Central Bank decision proceeded to buttress its conclusion with arguments about congressional intent and policy considerations.32 Faced with congressional silence, the Court refused to infer a broad intention to supplement primary liability with aiding and abetting liability, either in section lO(b) or generally throughout the Exchange Act.33 The Court observed that Congress had made a deliberate choice about the scope of secondary liability by explicitly creating liability for controlling persons in section 20.34 In addition, the majority opinion noted that Congress had enacted the Exchange Act against a regulatory backdrop in which many state blue sky laws imposed aiding and abetting liability.35 Finally, the opinion rejected arguments that subsequent Congresses had acquiesced in or ratified aiding and abetting liability. 3 6 The Court was unconvinced that legislative references to aiding and abetting constituted ratification, noting that these references were not the product of the formal legisla tive process.37 The decision also concluded that Congress's failure to overturn judicial decisions upholding aiding and abetting liability was not the equivalent of congressional approvai.38
The majority opinion similarly rejected policy arguments that aiding and abetting liability deters secondary actors from furthering fraudulent schemes and increases victim compensation.39 The Court warned that it was precluded from using policy considerations as a basis for overriding 45. Indeed, the Central Bank decision itself seems to recognize that the analysis employed would not be useful in ascertaining the elements of an acknowledged cause of action. See Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. Rev. 691, 712 (1997) (arguing that neither Central Bank's method of analysis nor its holding is relevant to determining the proper parameters of primary liability).
B. The Application of Central Bank
Recent decisions have sought to apply Central Bank's reasoning in an effort to develop liability standards for secondary defendants. Cases at both ends of the liability spectrum are relatively easy to resolve. Central Bank expressly endorses the concept of primary liability for outside pro fessionals who make fraudulent statements.4 6 Thus, when a lawyer or ac countant is sued on the basis of his or her own statements rather than those of the client, the professional faces primary liability under the stat ute.47 Such liability may arise, for example, from misrepresentations con tained in an opinion letter.48 Conversely, Central Bank seems to eliminate liability based upon pure gatekeeper or whistle blower theories of liability, in which an outside professional is sued for his or her inaction in failing to prevent a client's fraud.49 At least in circumstances in which the pro fessional owes no duty to the victims of the fraud, the failure to act or to speak is insufficient for the imposition of primary liability.5 0
The cases in between are more troubling. Traditionally, issuers have engaged outside professionals to assist in the task of preparing the is suer's disclosure documents. This assistance can take the form of advis ing the client on disclosure requirements, drafting the necessary docu mentation, and verifying that the client's disclosure is accurate and complete.51 In evaluating the potential liability of outside professionals based upon this role, one possible approach is to adopt a bright line rule that the client alone is responsible for the contents of its disclosure docu ments. 52 A few courts, such as those in the Second Circuit, have followed this approach, reasoning that for Central Bank to have any meaning a de-46. See supra note 6. 47. See, e.g., McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that accounting firm could be liable for its fraudulent audit report, which was included in client's Form 10-K and filed with the SEC). Although pre-Central Bank cases often termed this secondary liability, Central Bank makes it clear that this characterization was incorrect. See Prentice, supra note 45, at 707 (explaining that liability for one's own misrepresentations is primary, not secondary).
48. See, e.g., Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 486-87 (3d Cir. (1994) . 49. See Prentice, supra note 45, at 765-66 (explaining why the Central Bank decision should eliminate whistle blower liability).
50. The decision in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) , is one of the better known examples of a situation in which attorneys were held responsible for their failure to take action to stop a transaction once they learned of the use of false financial data. The court did not rely upon the existence of any duty to the victims as a basis for imposing liability. See id. at 713.
51. See, e.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 SMU L. Rev. 383, 387-90 (1996) (describing the role of the securities lawyer in assisting a client with the disclosure process). fendant must actually make a false and misleading statement rather than aid someone else.53 This approach is supported both by the text of the statute and by the concern articulated in Central Bank that the application of liability standards be sufficiently predictable. 54 Other courts, particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, have rejected the bright line rule in favor of the conclusion that liability can be im posed upon outside professionals who substantially participate in the dis closure process, even if the documents prepared do not purport to be statements by the professionai.55 The Third Circuit panel in Klein v. Boyd justified this result by explaining that sufficient assistance makes the pro fessional a co-author of the documents, thereby rendering the profes sional accountable for misrepresentations or omissions in those docu ments.56 Similarly, courts have reasoned that primary liability may extend to all members of the "drafting group."57 The SEC has advocated primary liability for an outside professional who "acting alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation."58 Under this theory, the secondary 53. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) . Even under the Second Circuit approach, a primary violator need not communicate directly with investors. Rather, liability is appropriate whenever a defendant is the source of a fraudulent misrepresentation and knows or should know that the misrepresentation will be communicated to investors. See, e.g., In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Related to this is the conclusion that an outside professional may be primarily liable for fraud committed through his or her direct contacts with investors. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that attorney and his law firm could be primarily liable based on "direct contacts" with the plaintiffs). See also Mishkin v. Ageloff, 1998 WL 651065 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998 , slip op. at 18 (finding allegations that defendant participated in a fraudulent scheme or committed a fraudulent act sufficient to state a claim for primary liability where defendant was a principal actor rather than an outside professional).
54. See Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (defending this approach as providing more guidance to outside professionals than a rule allowing liability to attach to those who provide substantial or significant assistance to the representations of others); accord Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226. Central Bank because it only imposes liability upon those who make mis representations (as opposed to those who provide substantial assistance), premising liability upon a professional's participation in a collective pro cess appears perilously close to the liability standard rejected by Central Bank.61 Moreover, even if one accepts the premise that an outside profes sional's participation in th e preparation of fr audulent client disclosure should result in liability under appropriate circumstances, the difficulties in applying this approach raise additional concerns. Using this approach, courts have premised liability upon the degree of the professional's par ticipation, explaining that the professional's involvement must be "sub stantial" or "significant." It is virtually impossible, however, to translate these terms into an articulable legal standard by which to quantify the level of participation necessary fo r the imposition of liability. This creates several problems.
First, imposing liability upon outside professionals based upon their level of participation is unpredictable and subject to an ad hoc fact-based evaluation.62 The Central Bank Court expressly identified an unpredict able standard of liability fo r outside professionals as undesirable. 53 Sec ond, the imposition of liability based upon a professional's degree of in volvement may have the practical effect of punishing him or her fo r professionally responsible behavior. 64 The purpose of engaging securi ties profe ssionals is to obtain th eir assistance in the preparation of the required disclosure documents, yet, a professional who diligently assists the client in preparing these documents is thereby subjected to liability ,341, 91,635 (D. Ga. 1998 ) (accepting the standard of liability advocated by the SEC and concluding that this standard is "consistent with the 'directly or indirectly' language in Section 10 (b)").
60. See SEC Amicus Brief in Klein, supra note 58, at 8-13 (arguing that a rule imposing liability only upon defendants who are identified to investors is inconsistent with Central Bank).
61. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Allegations of 'assisting,' 'participating in,' 'complicity in' and similar synonyms ... all fall within the prohibitive bar of Central Bank.").
62. The scienter requirement provides insufficient protection against liability due, in part, to its fact-based nature. In addition to the evidentiary problems posed by a professional's scienter defense, its imposition requires the defendant to go to trial, thereby incurring substantial litigation costs. These costs are the source of the settlement pressure identifi ed by the Court in Central Bank.
63. See Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994) . 64. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 13, in Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143 , 97-1261 (3d Cir. 1997 ) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (warning that "it may not be possible for attorneys to satisfy professional standards of competence without being substantially involved in the drafting process") [hereinafter City Bar Amicus Brief in Klein].
precisely because he or she has provided meaningful assistance. Third, the standard encourages securities professionals to distance themselves from their client's product by refusing to draft, review, or verify client statements. This result sacrifices both the client's interests and those of outside investors who benefit from the involvement of outside profession als in the preparation process.65
The existing lower court decisions are currently in conflict both as to the legal standard they articulate and the application of that standard. However, if the courts were to adopt a rule that imposes liability based upon some level of participation in the preparation of client disclosure, the result may be substantially to limit the practical effect of Central Bank and to apply, in essence, the pre-Central Bank liability standards under the new name of primary liability. 66 Apart from the question of whether this approach conflicts with Central Bank's reading of the statutory text, it raises concern over the policy considerations identified by the Court in Central Bank. These policy issues-the lack of predictability, the settle ment pressure imposed by fact-based liability standards, and the risk of vexatious litigation-would persist under a substantial participation liabil ity standard. 6 7
II. RECENT FEDERAL SECURITIES LEGISLATION
In attempting to formulate a test for when outside professionals should be held liable for federal securities fraud, it is necessary to expand the analysis beyond Central Bank. Subsequent to Central Bank, Congress adopted two significant amendments to the federal securities laws that specifically address private civil litigation. With respect to all three factors identified by the Central Bank decision-statutory text, legislative intent, and policy considerations-the amendments offer additional insight about the appropriate scope of liability for secondary defendants.
The statutes directly addressed the perceptions of abusive and vexa tious litigation that animated the Central Bank decision. In 1995, Con-65. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 51, at 396 (arguing that investors rely upon the lawyer's work in making investment decisions).
66. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule lOb-5: Chiarella's History, Cen tral Bank's Future, 20 DeL J Corp. L. 865, 869 (1995) (predicting that Central Bank decision would be a good candidate for lower court revisionism which could have the effect of substantially reducing the extent to which the decision changes the status quo).
67. Although few courts have experimented with other approaches, there are alternatives to both the bright line approach articulated in Wright and imposing liability based upon a sufficient degree of participation. It is possible, for example, to analogize to the Supreme Court's analysis in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) . In Pinter, the Court rejected the idea that primary liability as a seller under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 was limited to the owner of a security. Instead, the Court extended primary liability to include those who solicit the purchase of securities if they are motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve their own financial interests or those of the issuer. See id. at 642-47. A court could similarly predicate primary liability under section IO(b) on the defendant's financial interest, as well as participation, in the fraudulent transaction. 9, 12-13 (1996) 677, 698-99 (1979) (recognizing that analysis of whether Congress intended to create a private right of action must consider contemporary legal context, and that for statutes passed during an era in which courts consistently found implied remedies, it is appropriate to presume that Congress expected the statutes to be interpreted in conformity with that approach); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381 (1982) (implying a private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act on the theory that such a remedy was intended by the Congress that enacted the statute as a result of the contemporary legal context); Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 38 (arguing that strict textualism should not be applied to statutes that were drafted when it was not the official methodology for statutory interpretation).
88. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing an implied private right of action under section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 578 n(a) (1998)).
89. Indeed, at least one commentator has noted the irony in the Central Bank decision's reliance on textualism to reject aiding and abetting liability and, "in the same Second, the statutory structure of fe deral securities regulation, par ticularly the Sec uri ties Exchange Act of 1934, has led Congress to give little attention to weighing the policy issues inherent in securities regula tion and itself tailoring an enforcement mechanism to address particular ized policy objectives. In part, this has resulted fr om Congress delegating substantial rulemaking and enforcement power90 to the Securities and Exchange Commission.91 In retrospect, this delegation seems appropri ate-the SEC may be better able to respond in a rapid and nuanced man ner to the technical and fre quently changing securities industry with the tools of an administrative agency than could Congress through refine ments to the statutory text.92 In exercising its delegated authority, the SEC has relied heavily upon a joint public and private system of enforce ment, in which private civil litigation supplements government enforce ment efforts.93 The SEC's effo rt to strike a balance and to maintain ap propriate levels of enfo rcement accordingly bears a limited connection to the statutory text. Rev. 377, 407 (1996) Rev. 1183 Rev. , 1198 Rev. (1995 (arguing that recent securities legislation "can fairly be read" as congressional delegation of broad law-making authority to courts).
97. See Steve The!, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1091, 1134 (1997) ("The judge-made law of rule lOb-5 has already largely supplanted enacted statutes as the primary vehicle of securities regulation.").
98. See id.
99. See The!, supra note 96, at 1200 ("In the Sanctions Act, the Enforcement Act and the limitations legislation, Congress has acknowledged that the courts make the law of private liability fo r securities fraud and established a regime that contemplates the courts' continuing to do so.").
100. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 323-33 (1994) (describing different methodologies of statutory interpretation employed by the Court).
101. 513 U.S. 561, 581-82 (1995) (reasoning from legislative history that Congress did not intend to extend liability under section 12(2) to every private or secondary sale of securities, despite statutory language suggesting such a result).
102. See id. at 594 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's analysis of § 12(2) is motivated by its policy preferences.") ; id. at 596 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for statutory construction supported by "impressive policy reasons" but inconsistent with "statute's defining text") ; see also id. at 590-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion's methodology as inconsistent with the approach taken in Central Bank) . 111, 336-39 (1995) .
104. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) Mt er the Gustafs on Debacle, 50 Bus. Law. 1231 Law. , 1270 Law. (1995 ; The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 103, at 338-39 (acknowledging that "majority's ultimate holding ... is widely perceived to be benefi cial for policy reasons").
105. See, e.g., Therese Maynard, A Requiem: Reflections on Gustafson, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 1327 (1996) (describing and criticizing the Gustafson Court's disregard for the statutory language and structure); Brian E. Burns, Comment, Red Means Green: The Disruption of the Statutory Construction Process in Gustafs on to Harmonize Section 12(2) and Rule 10b-5 Private Liability Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 57 Ohio St. LJ. 1365 LJ. , 1389 LJ. (1996 (describing Gustafs on as "a structural approach, 'dynamic' approach, or some unconventional variation of a conventional textual approach" and as "a drastic departure from the Court's consistently literal plain meaning approach in construing the federal securities laws").
106. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 107. See, e.g., Walker & Levine, supra note 27, at 5 (describing O'Hagan decision as a retreat from the textual analysis of Central Bank) ; Fahey, supra note 92, at 530 (arguing that O' Hagan decision was based on purposivism, not textualism). Even if the lower courts reject a strong textualist approach, they may nonetheless be reluctant to rely heavily on the recent legislation in inter preting the scope of outside professional liability. The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to consider subsequent legislative developments in interpreting the scope of a statute. l11 Indeed, in Central Bank, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that Congress's adoption of several amendments to the federal securities laws after courts widely interpreted section 10 (b) to provide a cause of action fo r aiding and abetting securi ties fr aud was evidence that Congress acquiesced m these interpretations. 112
Commentators typically proffer two bases upon which to consider subsequent legislation: ratification and acquiescence. Ratification re quires affirmative action by Congress. This action can arguably range from Congress reenacting the statute in question and explicitly adopting the courts' interpretation, to Congress adopting a subsequent statute that builds upon the structure established by the interpretation, to a congres sional vote that defeats a proposed amendment to overturn the interpre tation.113 The strongest argument in favor of ratification characterizes Congress's action as an adoption of the courts' interpretation of the stat ute and an incorporation of that interpretation into law. The counter argument is that, for this adoption to have the effect of lawmaking, it can only be achieved through the formal legislative process.
It is more difficult to justify reliance on congressional acquiescence as a basis fo r referencing subsequent legislation because it is, in effect, reliance on congressional silence or inaction. The argument is that when Congress amends a statute that has been previously interpreted by the courts without revising the statute to modify the courts' interpretation, the amendment constitutes implicit approval of those aspects of the inter pretation that have not been changed. As the Court and commentators have observed, the vagaries of the legislative process make it difficult to ascertain the causes of congressional inaction. This makes it hazardous to use inaction as an indication of congressional intent.
the practice does not violate section 10(b) 's broad prohibition against manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances.
111. See, e.g., Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989) ("We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute.").
112. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 114. "Congress's fa ilure to overturn a statutory precedent is [not] reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is 'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of the Court's There is a difference, however, between using congressional ratifica ti on or acquiescence as a basis fo r adhering to a prior judicial interpre ta tion of a statute and looking to subsequent legislation fo r interpretive guidance.115 This is particularly true wh en, as in the present case, the subsequent legislation both provides affirmative evidence of the congres sional objectives behind the regulatory scheme and reconfigures that scheme in light of problems that had previously been identified by the Court. It is possible to argue-as the Court does, particularly when it employs strict textualism-that the intent of the current Congress is irrel evant to the question of how to interpret a statute passed a number of years ago. l 1 6 Still, the separation of powers principles that support textu alism also counsel deference to the legislature to resolve policy issues. Rev. 737, 746-48 (1985) (explaining why it is inappropriate to rely on congressional silence or inaction as probative of congressional intent).
115. Cf. The!, supra note 97, at 1093-94 (arguing that Court's analysis of the misappropriation theory of insider trading should be influenced by statutory "findings" contained in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988).
116. Cf. id. at 1122 (evaluating power of Congress to decide in 1988 what it intended in an earlier statute).
117. See generally Eskridge, supra note 100 (advocating a methodology in which statutes are interpreted in light of post-enactment developments and cunent societal context). S. 642, 654 (1997). 119. 501 U.S. 1083, 1104-05 (1991 Rev. 639, 640 (1996) (describing proportionate liability as "a centerpiece proposal for reform, but largely as a mechanism for benefiting the collateral participant (usually accountants and lawyers) ").
127. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 301, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 762-64 (adding § 681, 687 (1985) (describing Congress's remedial purpose of providing full and fair disclosure in enacting the federal securities laws).
135. See, e.g., City Bar Amicus Brief in Central Bank, supra note 25 (describing gatekeeping role of outside professionals in assuring proper functioning of federal securities laws and investor reliance upon that role).
136. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 51, at 386 (" [I] t is the securities lawyer who controls the disclosure process and who undertakes to align the interests of the client issuer with the client's investors."). to liability of outside professionals, the decision demonstrated a judicial inability or unwillingness to attempt to balance these policy concerns. In fo rmulating a rule of primary liability fo r secondary defendants, lower courts may be able to address this omission and to effe ct a compromise between the two competing goals. With the advent of legislative reform, the courts' task is simplified. To the extent that the Reform Act has re duced the exposure of outside professionals to vexatious litigation, 1 37 courts have the leeway to adopt a liability rule that places greater empha sis on the gatekeeping fu nction without subjecting professionals to exces sive litigation risk.
Moreover, the structure of the Reform Act suggests that Congress intended fo r the courts to perfo rm this fu nction. Rather than specify the circumstances under which outside professionals should be liable in pri vate litigation, Congress adopted a framework under which the courts are required to make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, although Congress has endorsed liability fo r secondary defendan ts, the Reform Act leaves fo r the courts the job of fine-tuning such liability con sistent with the statutory goals that place primary importance on fu ll and fair disclosure138 and the protection of investors.139
The recent adoption of the Uniform Standards Act lends additional support to this position. Although the Reform Act reduced the liability exposure of secondary defendants under fe deral law, it was still possible fo r plaintiffs to bring state court actions based upon state blue sky laws or common law fr aud. Many states applied generous liability rules to joint tortfe asors that could undercut the protection of the proportionate liabil ity provision.140 Indeed, immediately after the adoption of the Reform Act, plaintiffs filed a number of securities fraud suits in state court, pre- These suits did not appear, however, to be effo rts to circumvent the pro portionate liability provision of the Act.142
The Uniform Standards Act effectively eliminates this substitute liti gation. By providing exclusive fe deral court jurisdiction fo r all private class action litigation arising fr om fraudulent securities transactions, the Act secures the previously adopted litigation reforms fo r secondary de fe ndants in virtually all cases involving large scale damage claims. Thus, the Uniform Standards Act supplements the Reform Act in providing more complete application of the provisions aimed at reducing vexatious litigation. At the same time, the Uniform Standards Act ensures that the fe deral courts will be the ultimate authority on the circumstances under which it is appropriate to hold secondary defendants accountable.143 142. See Walker, supra note 137, at 678 (observing that initial state court suits filed after the Reform Act did not seem to be aimed at "peripheral deep pocket defendants").
143
. A distinct component of the Uniform Standards Act further supports reading it as a congressional affirmation of broad judicial lawmaking authority. The Reform Act raised some question about whether Congress intended to change the judicially developed standard for establishing scienter under section 10 (b). See Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 Emory LJ. 1, 50-51 (1998) (discussing judicial disagreement over whether Reform Act eliminated liability for reckless conduct). In response to concerns expressed by the SEC, Congress expressly stated in the legislative history of the Uniform Standards Act that it did not intend to change the recklessness standard. See The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1988 , S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998 (" [T] he Committee emphasizes that the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this legislation is that neither PSLRA nor S. 1260 in any way alters the scienter standard in fe deral securities fraud suits."); Rachel Witmer, Litigation Reform: SEC Throws Weight Behind Reform Bill, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 477 (1998) (describing congressional response to SEC's concerns). Notably, rather than adopting its own substantive standard, Congress again expressed its approval of the standard crafted by the fe deral courts.
courts to develop those liability rules and, in so doing, to consider the objectives and policies inherent in federal securities regulation.
Acknowledging the significance of the recent legislation does not free the lower courts from hard choices. It does, however, suggest that some lower courts such as the Second Circuit in Wright are taking an unnecessarily restrictive approach by requiring that a defendant actually make a fraudulent statement in order to incur primary liability. Even decisions like Klein, which rely on a broad conception of who is a speaker, may have been unduly constrained by the effort to limit primary liability to defendants who are the speakers or authors of misleading statements. Such a liability rule does not recognize the substantial and important role played by securities professionals in the preparation of disclosure docu ments. Nor does it take cognizance of the importance of encouraging a close and candid relationship between the professional and his client. Finally, the liability rule fails to consider the importance of securities pro fessionals as gatekeepers and effectively allows unscrupulous professionals to insulate themselves from liability at the expense of investor protection. As future courts struggle to answer the questions left unresolved by Cen tral Bank, the foregoing policies should enable them to formulate a stan dard more faithful to the statutory purposes.
This conclusion is strikingly consistent with William Cary's vision of the appropriate role for the federal courts in interpreting the federal se curities laws. Decisions written by Cary on behalf of the SEC, such as the Cady, Roberts decision, 144 as well as the SEC's advocacy position in cases like Borak, 145 illustrate Cary's view that the federal courts should interpret the federal securities laws broadly to further the remedial goals of inves tor and market protection. Cary's legacy continues to be felt, as the fed eral courts have become entrenched in the role of developing the federal securities laws and, in many cases, have accepted Cary's ideas about the appropriate statutory goals. Cary's legacy gave federal securities regula tion a structure that maintains a delicate balance between investor protec tion and excessive liability exposure. Recent legislation demonstrates a congressional commitment, in large part, to the contours of that balance, and to the preservation of the regulatory structure envisioned by Cary. To the extent that Central Bank's textualist approach argues against this structure, it threatens the fundamental policy objectives of the securities laws.
CONCLUSION
Although the Court has never formally repudiated its decision in JI. Case v. Borak, since that time it has retreated from the general approach espoused by William Cary, both by reducing its willingness to recognize implied private rights of action and by rejecting its formerly expansive 144. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) . 145. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 ( 1964) .
